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LEVIN, JEFFRIES, AND THE FATE OF ACADEMIC

AUTONOMY
NATHAN GLAZER*
Not long after Brown v. Board of Education,' as the courts
continued to grapple with Brown's first-generation progeny-those cases dealing directly with segregation-a second-generation of desegregation cases began to emerge. Second-generation cases arose when, for example, blacks lost positions as prncipals and teachers during desegregation ' and when parents objected to the disproportionate disciplimng of black students in
desegregated schools.3 Third- and fourth-generation cases, highlighting the subissues which flow from each successive judicial
interpretation and order, also exist.
Brown, as we all know, marked not only the end of a series of
major constitutional cases, but the beginmng of new issues leading to new cases, issues that are still with us. Among these
issues is that of "hate speech,"4 which concerns the language
used by students, faculty, and adminstrators in integrated
schools when referring to race, and its potential impact on school
atmosphere, students, and faculty 5 The issue is whether under
the First Amendment,6 the use of the varieties of what we have
* Professor, Graduate School of Education, Harvard Umversity.
1. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
2. See, e.g., Morgan v. Burke, 926 F.2d 86 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1664 (1992); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th
Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch.
Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1981); Vaughns v. Board of
Edue., 574 F Supp. 1280 (D. Md. 1983), affd inpart and rev'd in peirt, 758 F.2d
983 (4th Cir. 1985); Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
4. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND 53 (Robert W. Gordon & Margaret J.
Radin eds., 1993) (discussing cases involving hate speech).
5. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part
and vacated zn part, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct.
502 (1994); Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd in part and
vacated in part, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
6. "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech
" U.S.
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come to call "hate speech" can be constrained or pumshed.
The constitutional protections of the First Amendment recognized by the Supreme Court provide broad latitude for free expression and speech regardless of content. To some extent, the
necessity of this broad-based protection is clear. There are situations, however, in which "truth" matters; settings where the
search for truth shifts the focus away from the traditional applications of open forum free speech. Specifically, in the academic
institutional setting, judicial and constitutional protections for
freedom of expression and speech must be balanced against the
need for institutional autonomy, academic pursuit, and orgamzational and educational practicality
The cases of Professors Michael Levin and Leonard Jeffries of
City College, both of which ended up in federal court as free
speech cases, 7 are forerunners of a new type of issue in the area
of "hate speech." When we use the term "hate speech" and argue
over the rules that are being written by various colleges and
campuses to control it, we generally have in mind students and
student behavior. It is these situations-such as that of Eden
Jacobowitz at the University of Pennsylvama-that have received national attention.' Levin and Jeffnes raise a somewhat
different, but related, issue. Here, what is at issue is the writing, speeches, and teaching of faculty members with tenure, not
epithets uttered by students or teachers in the heat of the moment. The focus of this Essay is the potential constitutional limitation imposed upon reasoned speech and writing by faculty
members whose words offend or outrage a particular group. In
the cases I will discuss, the City College of New York acted to
discipline the professors involved for their reasoned, even if not
fully reasoned, expression of opinions.9 Has free speech been
inhibited? What are the rights and recourse of the faculty member, the college administration, and the offended groups?
The line between expression of opinions and mere epithets is

CONST., amend. 1.
7. Jeffries, 828 F Supp. at 1066; Levin, 770 F Supp. at 895.
8. See, e.g., Michael D. Hines, A Campus Case: Speech or Harassment?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1993, § 1, at 6 (recounting the Jacobowitz incident and some of its
repercussions).
9. Jeffries, 828 F Supp. at 1074-77; Levin, 770 F Supp. at 917-18.
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not easy to draw- one fear about speech codes is that they will
inhibit reasoned speech. What one person may consider reasonable argument, such as questiomng the reported scale of the
holocaust or positing that intellectual abilities differ by race,
another will consider an outrageous, harmful expression of hate
which is damaging to students of the affected group. Clearly, we
are only at the beginning of the emergence and development of
some complex issues. In this paper I deal with only one issue in
this field: the appropriateness of employing free speech standards in response to the problem created when faculty members
take positions in writing, speech, or teaching that one or another
group finds outrageous and damaging.
LEVIN AND JEFFRIES: THE SIMILARITIES
The superficially similar cases of Professors Michael Levin
and Leonard Jeffries of the City College of New York, a unit of
the City University of New York (CUNY) raises the issue sharply 10 In both cases, tenured members of the City College faculty
wrote or said things that persons in the College and outside-including faculty, students, administrators, and elements
of the general public-believed were reprehensible, outrageous,
offensive, and false." In both situations, the College took some
action against the faculty members. 2 In both, the subjects of
these actions resorted to the federal courts, arguing that they
had been damaged by the adnnmistration's response and, because the action was taken by a state agency in response to
speech, that their right to free speech had been violated." In
both, the same federal judge agreed they had been penalized for
their exercise of free speech and ordered the College to restore
them to their previous positions.' 4 (The Levin proceedings were
before the judge alone, 5 the Jeffries proceedings were before

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Jeffnes, 828 F Supp. at 1066; Levzn, 770 F Supp. at 895.
See Jeffres, 828 F Supp. at 1073, 1075-76; Levin, 770 F Supp. at 1074-77.
Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1074-77; Levin, 770 F Supp. at 917-18.
Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1071-72; Levin, 770 F Supp. at 899.
Jeffnes, 828 F. Supp. at 1071-72; Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 897-98.
Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 899.
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judge and jury,16 and in the latter case, the jury also awarded
substantial financial compensation.)" In both, one may see the
outcome as a positive example of the proper protection of individual rights by the Constitution, and a triumph of American
constitutional law
Thus it is possible, if one closes one's eyes to a great deal, to
see the two cases as essentially equivalent. This, I believe, is the
position of Bernard Harleston, the president of the College at
the time of the two cases, who saw himself as defending the
same important values in each and took the position that the
College was threatened in a very similar way by the actions of
both members." As the losing defendant in both cases, he of
course defended the actions the College took in response to the
protests of students and outside elements attacking the views
and actions of Professors Levin and Jeffries. Defenders of the
appropriateness of resorting to free speech doctrine in bringing
the two cases to a satisfactory resolution would also see the two
cases as equivalent. In both cases, objectionable things were said
and written, the College took some action, and the constitutional
law protecting freedom of speech was invoked in order to defend
a major principle.
Those who see the two cases as equivalent emphasize two
basic values: the maintenance of harmony among the various
ethnic, racial, and religious groups that make up our diverse society (and the particularly diverse City College of New York) and
the preservation of academic values which place truth and the
search for truth above all else. The defenders of the outcomes in
Levin and Jeffrzes generally see no conflict between these two
values. They attack the views of both Levin and Jeffries as false,
hateful, and disruptive of intergroup harmony What their posture would be if they recognized that sometimes true assertions
can undermine intergroup harmony is not easy to divine. They
are content to rest in the relatively easy position that the two
plaintiffs were in the same position in regard to truth as well as
constitutional law- wrong about truth, but equally entitled to

16. Jeffries, 828 F Supp. at 1071.
17. Id. at 1078.
18. See Jeffries, 828 F Supp. at 1081-82; Levin, 770 F Supp. at 912-14.
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propagate their falsehoods. It was clearly the College President's
view that the simultaneous pursuit of these two objectives of upholding truth and fostering intergroup harmony are not contradictory-the truth would serve to promote harmony among ethmc groups, and even if there was no way to expunge fully what
were to him the obnoxious falsehoods propounded by the two
professors that were undernmng harmony, at least it could be
made clear to those outraged by them that the adimistration
would in some way show its displeasure with the two faculty
members in question.
To present the two cases as parallel, as President Harleston
has, shows the even-handedness and fair-mindedness of the admimstrator. Racism, whether that of a white philosopher justifying the differential treatment of blacks, or the black scholar condemmng Jews for mistreatment of blacks, would be found equally reprehensible, and some action to demonstrate the
adminstrator's sympathy with those outraged by these views
would be taken. To insist on the equivalence of the two cases
can also serve as a stick to beat those who have expressed their
outrage that Professor Jeffries still maintains his position as
Professor and Chairman of Black Studies while they remain
silent on Professor Levin. When the two cases are considered
equivalent-the words of both professors equally obnoxious-one
can argue criticism of one should be stayed unless it is made
equally of both. Consider the letter of Reginald Wilson, Senior
Scholar with the American Council of Education:
I find Mary Lefkowitz's cry of outrage at the academy not
meting out swift justice to Anthony C. Martin [a professor at
Wellesley College who argues as Jeffries does that Jews bear
some special culpability for slavery] and Leonard Jeffnes, Jr.,
a little naive.
Just prior to the Leonard Jeffies incident, there was the
case of Michael Levin, who teaches that blacks are genetically inferior to whites, which is conspicuously absent from Ms.
Lefkowitz's complaints. In that case, the judge ruled not only
that Mr. Levin was protected by academic freedom, but that
the umversity could not offer an alternative section for students who might have been offended by his "false theories."
But, then, I suppose that what Mr. Levin teaches is all right.
It's just upsetting when someone teaches falsehoods about my
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group.
Let me say that I find Mr. Martin's and Mr. Jeffries's
views repugnant and, moreover, not substantiated by scientific evidence. But I will not pursue them with the zeal Ms.
Lefkowitz demands while academics rise in defence of Mr.
Levin, Arthur Jensen, Philip Rushton, William Shockley, and
the legions of academics who insist that these professors who
propound erroneous racial theories are merely pursuing "disinterested research."19
I will argue that despite the similarities between the two
cases, there are also profound differences between them, and the
differences raise a number of crucial issues. To consider them
only as cases of the penalization of free speech is to mimnnze or
to ignore the differences between them. These differences should
have been primary in an academic institution, but they could
not even be raised in the forum of the federal courtroom. From
one point of view the absence of a legal forum for discussion of
these differences might be considered a virtue. Why should laws
affecting free speech distinguish between truth and falsehood?
From the point of view of the College and University and its
values, however, the absence of an analysis of "truth" is rather a
serious limitation. In an academic institution, truth must be a
primary value. In making free speech the primary issue in these
cases, truth became irrelevant. Free speech constitutional law
has evolved and been elaborated to a degree that is often surprising to many of us-regulations on what sort of clothing one
may wear to school, for example, have become "free speech"
cases.2" Obviously, in view of the development and present posture of free speech law, it was perfectly appropriate for a federal
court to have accepted as legitimate both complaints. I will explore what to me seem to be the great differences between the

19. Reginald Wilson, Hypocrisy in Attacks on Racist Teaching, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 2, 1994, at B3.
20. See, e.g., Crosby v. Holsinger, 816 F.2d 162, 163 (4th Cir. 1987) (regarding
prohibition of wearing Confederate symbols in school); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified
Sch. Dist., 827 F Supp. 1459, 1460 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (regarding school prohibition of
students wearing college and professional sports logos). For discussion and annotation of cases about student clothing and free speech, see W.E. Shipley, Annotation,
Validity of Regulation by Public School Authorities as to Clothes or Personal Appearance, 14 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1967).
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cases, and ask, what was the alternative to a judicial settlement
of the matter under constitutional law?
THE FACTS IN THE LEVIN CASE

The facts of the two cases are well presented in Judge Kenneth Conboy's decisions. In his Opinion and Order in Levin he
wrote:
A professor who has had tenure for over sixteen years at one
of America's most famous institutions of higher learning,
singularly noted for its bracing environment of broad and
untrammeled speech, claims that his tenure is in jeopardy,

his students drawn away, his classes disrupted, his reputation injured and his speech chilled as a result of the actions

of Ins college's administrators, who are said to be repelled by
his views on affirmative action quotas and the relative intelligence of blacks and whites, and who are said to be, by their
actions, seeking to suppress those views.
The college officials say that Ins views are odious, and
rightly denounced, and that although he has committed no
act of academic misconduct or discrimination against his students, and although there is no complaint by any of his students against him, they are permitted to structure the class
schedule to provide alternative professors to "insulate" and
"protect" his present and future students from his views."

Michael Levn's troubles arose from a letter he and Margarita
Levin wrote to the New York Times,22 a book review he published in the Australian journal Quadrant," and a letter he
published in the Proceedings and Addresses of the American
PhilosophicalAssociation.24 The letter to the New York Times
responded to an editorial on whether young black men may be
treated differently because they.are statistically more likely to
2
commit criminal actsY.
For example, should storekeepers deny

21. Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 898 (footnote omitted).
22. Michael Levin & Margarita Levm, Howard Beach Turns a Beam on Racial
Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1987 § 4, at 30 [hereinafter N.Y. TIMEs Letter].
23. Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 902.
24. Michael Levin, Letter to the Editor, PROC. & ADDRESSES OF THE AM. PHIL.
Ass'N, Jan. 1990, at 62.
25. Fear of Blacks, Fear of Crime, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1986 § 4, at 10.
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admittance to persons they suspect may be up to mischief on the
basis of their race? The issue was raised by the assault on some
black men who were in a white neighborhood in New York
City2 The many, the Times argued, should not be penalized
for the sins of a few 27 The Times referred to the philosopher
John Rawls and paraphrased his position as follows: "No one
ought to endorse a social order that he could not accept if he
were in the shoes of the most disadvantaged."2" Levn's letter
argued against this use of the Rawls' principle.Y His language
was direct and unmodulated:
Rawls proposes this principle as a test of the basic institutions of a society, if they were being chosen from a position of
total ignorance about one's actual place m that society It
does not constrain particular decisions made within a given
society
when specific information is available about the
actual risks one faces.
If information about appearance can be used to reduce the
probability of being attacked, one may use it. Even other
blacks are presumably more wary of 17-year-old black males
wearing running shoes and hooded sweatshirts than they are
of other members of the population.0
He then criticized the Times for supporting affirmative action,
which he asserted penalizes whites innocent of discrimination.3 '
"Is discriminating against innocent whites a tolerable price for
insuring jobs for blacks, while discriminatory inconvenience for
innocent blacks is too high a32 price for reducing the risk of murder for white store owners?"
A year later in the Australian journal Quadrant Michael Levin reviewed Cultural Literacy3 and The Closing of the Amer-

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. N.Y. TIMES Letter, supra note 22, at 30.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. E.D. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AmERICAN NEEDS To KNow
(1987).
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can Mind. 4 In his review, Levn referred to the well-known
discrepancy between white and black academic performance, and
wrote:
[T]he only adjustments in educational measures that will
allow blacks their due number of successes amount to making
course-work and tests easier and easier, and this is what has
been going on for over thirty years. Conversely, if standards
are going to be raised, cultural literacy reasserted and college
education given its old depth and focus, the American polity
will have to reconcile itself to an embarrassing failure rate
for blacks.35
In his letter to the Proceedings and Addresses of the American
PhilosophicalAssociation in 1990, Levin argued that the reason
for the low representation of blacks in the field of philosophy
was their lower level of intelligence on average. 6
Shortly after he published Ins letter in the Times, Michael
Levin's troubles began. Pamphlets were distributed outside his
class,37 a demonstration took place outside his classroom during
which students were blocked from entering the classroom, 8 and
other demonstrations followed. Levin reported all this to campus security," and to members of the admmstration, including
President Harleston. 4" No action was taken against the student
demonstrators,42 but a security guard was assigned to Professor
Levin's classes. 3
After his review in the Quadrant appeared, Michael Levm
was condemned by the Faculty Senate of City College for expressing "racist prejudices [offensive to] our fundamental notions
of human decency"" President Harleston commended the action of the Faculty Senate and suggested that it appoint a spe34. ALLAN D. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AiMERICAN MIND (1987).

35. Levin v. Harleston, 770 F Supp. 895, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
36. Levin, supra note 24, at 62.
37. Levin, 770 F Supp. at 903.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 903-05.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See td.
43. Id. at 905.
44. Id. at 907 (alteration in original).
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cial committee "to receive, investigate and make recommendations concermng any charges of bias related activities by faculty
directed to or in interaction with students."4 5 The Faculty Senate did not follow up on the proposal.46
Michael Levin teaches a required course for undergraduates
in philosophy 4 7 In the Spring of 1990, shortly after his letter in
the Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical
Associatin appeared, without Levin's knowledge, another section of this course, meeting at the same time as Levin's, was created.48 The action was taken by the Dean, despite the opposition of the chairman of the Philosophy Department.4 9 The Dean
sent a letter to Professor Levin's students informing them of this
alternative.5 0 He explained in this letter that the action was
taken because Professor Levin had "expressed controversial
views."51
In April of 1990, President Harleston, having been rebuffed a
second time in requesting that the College Faculty Senate appoint a committee to look into the issue of bias or racism at the
College, and specifically the writing of Professor Levin,"2 announced that he would form an ad hoc committee to consider
whether Professor Levin's views affected his teaching ability5 3
President Harleston was quoted in the campus newspaper as
saying, "[tihe process of removing a tenured professor is a complicated one."54 The formal charge to the committee was "to review the question of when speech both in and outside the classroom may go beyond the protection of academic freedom or become conduct unbecoming a member of the faculty, or some other form of misconduct."5 5 The committee was asked specifically

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 910-11.
Id. at 911.
Id.
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to review information concerning Michael Levin. 56 The
admimstration's actions were later deplored in a resolution by
the Faculty Senate."1
The committee report, issued on February 5, 1991, asserted
that a tension existed between the principles of academic freedom and free speech, and the college's obligation to "uphold
students' rights to a supportive learmng environment. 58 The
Committee found that:
[Tihere are utterances by faculty, even outside of class, that
can have a detrimental impact on the educational process. In
particular, statements denigrating the intellectual capability
of groups by virtue of race, ethnicity or gender have the clear
potential to undermine the learning
environment and to place
59
students in academic jeopardy
This was the situation in regard to Professor Levin's students.
The statements by Professor Levin alleging the intellectual
inferiority of blacks does, in our view, clearly have the potential to harm the process of education inhis classes
Thus
we find that it is appropriate for the College to continue to
carefully
implement ways to protect the students from such
60
harm.
The committee report supported the establishment of a parallel
section to Professor Levin's courses but recommended no disciplinary action.6 '
By the time the report was published, Professor Jeffries, professor and Chairman of Black Studies, had also become notorious. The Ad Hoc Committee's report referred to "statements
attributed to Professor Jeffries to the effect that AIDS was created as part of a conspiracy by whites to destroy blacks or that
make sweeping negative characterizations of whites."62 While
"many would find [these statements] outrageous and possibly

56. Id.
57. Id. at 912.
58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id.
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offensive,"" the Committee asserted that these statements "do
not impact directly on the process of education in class."'
While "they may be deplorable, they should neither lead to disciplinary proceedings
nor .other College administrative responses."" The report makes a distinction between statements
made in public forums or in class that have the capacity to affect
the learning environment, and statements that "have a generally] negative effect on the campus atmosphere, but that do not
impact directly on the process of education in class."" Jeffries'
and Levin's statements both had a negative effect, but only
Levin's statements affected the process of classroom education.
Thus, measures to protect students from harm were appropriate
in the case of Professor Levin, but not in the case of Professor
Jeffries. The report did not present any evidence regarding the
work of Professors Levin and Jeffries as classroom teachers,67
but took it as a given, requiring no further argument, that Professor Levin's publicly stated position must affect how minority
students respond to him as a teacher.
At trial, Professor Levin testified that he believed that his
tenure was in danger and that President Harleston was going to
try to fire him. One consequence of this belief was that Professor
Levin 68
turned down many invitations to speak or write about his
views.
Judge Conboy found that there had been a chilling effect on
Professor Levin's exercise of the right to free speech, 69 and the
College was permanently enjoined from "commencing or threatening to commence any disciplinary proceedings against, or
other investigations of Professor Michael Levin predicated solely
upon his protected expression of ideas," ° and "from creating or
maintaining 'shadow' or 'parallel' sections of his classes."7 ' The

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 912-14.
Id.
Id. at 919-24.
Id. at 927.
Id.
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College was further commanded to take reasonable steps to
prevent disruption of Professor Michael Levrn's classes."7 2
There were further legal proceedings in the case, but on the
key issues Judge Conboy's injunction was sustained.7 3
THE FACTS IN THE JEFFRIES CASE
Leonard Jeffnes was chairman of the Black Studies department at City College.74 He had been chairman since the department was created in 1972. 7" He was nominated by the department faculty for a seventh consecutive term of three years on
June 5, 1991.76 At City College, the faculties of each department nominate chairmen through elections, subject to the approval of the President of the College and the Board of Trustees.77 The Board of Trustees missed voting on this normally pro
forma action before the end of his previous term as chairman on
June 30, but the President of the College sent him a congratulatory letter on his reappointment on July 1.78
On July 20, Jeffries gave a speech in Albany, at the Empire
State Black Arts and Cultural Festival, on multicultural education.7" Jeffres had previously served as a consultant to a New
York State task force on multicultural education 0 and was
chief author of its report."' The report, which advocated a complete reformation of New York State education to reverse what
it called the "intellectual and educational oppression [of minonties] that has characterized the culture and institutions of the
United States and the European-American world for centuries," 82 was severely criticized by leading historians and by New
York State media for its intemperateness and its proposals. 3
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See Levm v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1241 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1241-42.
New York State Commssioner of Education's Task Force on Minorities.
81. COMM'R'S TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, A CuRRIcuLUM OF INCLUSION: EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE (1989).
82. Id.
83. Nathan Glazer, Multiculturalism and Public Policy, in VALUES AND PUBLIC
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4
The controversy led to the appointment of another committee,5
whose own report had just appeared, 5 again to a storm of criticism. 8 So multiculturalism and its implications for education
were high on the public agenda in New York State in the summer of 1991.
In his speech, Jeffries attacked certain critics as Jews hostile
to blacks and attacked Jews generally for their role in the slave
trade and in Hollywood, where he asserted they were responsible for a demeamng representation of blacks." A storm of criticism by major media organs and by leading public officials followed. 8 Editorialists and political officials asked why
Jeffries-who had been in the news earlier because of his outlandish theories, as propagated in his classes-was still a tenured professor at City College and why he was chairman of the
Black Studies program.89
The College administration and the Board of Trustees of
CUNY responded in a variety of ways to this uproar. ° The College administration, which had a good deal of experience with
Professor Jeffries, and the CUNY chancellor attempted to find
the minimal response that would still the outcry On the other
hand, the Board of Trustees of CUNY included a good number of
board members who had the desire, but lacked the ability, to fire

POLICY 113, 131-32 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994); see also A Tough Test for the
Regents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at A34; Diane Ravitch, U.S. Schools Need an
Integrated World History: Diversity and Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1990, at A26;
Give It a D; Bad Report with a Good Idea, NEWSDAY, Feb. 13, 1990, at 46.
84. Social Studies Syllabus Review Committee.
85. SOCIAL STUDIES SYLLABUS REVIEW COMM., N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP'T, ONE NATION, MANY PEOPLES: A DECLARATION OF CULTURAL INTERDEPENDENCE (1991).
86. Glazer, supra note 83, at 133; see also NY Is Losing Sight of America,
NEWSDAY, June 30, 1991, at 35; Joseph Berger, Arguing About America: A Common
2
Culture or a Land of Diversity That Is the Curriculum Debate in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 1991, at Al.
87. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1242 (2d Cir. 1994).
88. Id., see, e.g., Jonathan Yardley, In New York, a Bigoted Man on Campus,
WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1991, at B2; A Professor Flaunts His Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1991, at A26.
89. See, e.g., Why the Delay on Dr Jeffries?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at A24
("The City University of New York's decision to allow Dr. Leonard Jeffries to stay as
chairman of City College's black studies department sends an alarming message.").
90. Jeffries, 21 F.3d at 1242.
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Jeffries outright.9 The solution that finally emerged, which
scarcely satisfied those who had called for Jeffries' ouster, was
to reduce his term as chairman from three years to one. 2 The
Board of Trustees so voted on October 28, 1991." The College
went on to seek a new chairman, and the Board of Trustees voted to appoint Professor Edmund Gordon, who had long served at
Yale, to take over the chairmanship when Jeffries' abbreviated
term ended in June.' Jeffres then sued the president of the
College, the chancellor of CUNY, and members of the Board of
Trustees who had voted to reduce the length of his chairmanship, on the grounds that he was removed from the department
chairmanship in violation of his First Amendment right to free
speech.9 5 He asked for reinstatement to the chairmanship and
for punitive damages.9 6
The case was tried before a jury which, responding to questions set by the judge, found that the speech Jeffries gave in
Albany was "a substantial or motivating factor" in the reduction
of his term as chairman, that he would not have had his term
reduced had he not made the speech in Albany, and that the
defendants had not shown that his speech "hampered the effective and efficient operation of the Black Studies Department."9"
In apparent contradiction to this last vote, however, the jury
also found that the defendants "were motivated in their action
by a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs July 20, 1991
speech would cause the disruption of the effective and efficient
operation of the Black Studies Department, the College, or the
Umversity "" The jury also agreed that Jeffries had been "deof property rights without due process of law "" The
prived
jury awarded hun $400,000 in punitive damages, assessed

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F Supp. 1066, 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd in part
and vacated in part, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994).
94. Jeffires, 21 F.3d at 1243.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Jeffres, 828 F. Supp. at 1077.
98. Id. at 1077-78.
99. Id. at 1078.
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against the defendants.0 0 The judge accepted the jury's verdicts but reduced the punitive damages.10 ' Jeffies was reinstated as chairman to serve the two years he was denied." 2 On
appeal, the Second Circuit upheld his reinstatement but found
in the contradictory determinations of the jury a basis to vacate
the award of punitive damages.0 3
In his Opinion and Order, Judge Conboy indicated what he
thought the defendants-the College president, the University
Chancellor, and the members of the Board of Trustees-would
have to have done to defend themselves against the charge of
violating Jeffries' freedom of speech by cutting his 3-year term to
1-year: they would have had to show that "either the consequences of the speech disrupted the campus, classes, administration,
fund-raising, or faculty relations or that the professor had
turned his classroom into a forum for bizarre, shallow, racist
and incompetent pseudo-thinking and pseudo-teaching."" 4 The
judge's language, here and elsewhere in his Opinion and Order,
suggests strongly that he believed that the defendants could
have made such an effective defense but did not. His Opimon
and Order is peppered with such terms as "amazingly," and
"astonishingly,"0 5 describing the administration's failure to
create the "paper trail" that would have justified the action
taken against Jeffries.
The defense did show that Jeffries had long been a subject of
adnunistrative concern:
[A]s far back as November of 1984, Professor Jeffres made
anti-semitic and racist remarks to a candidate interviewing
for the position of director of the College's International Studies Program. As a result of the remarks, the candidate withIn the face of what seems to be totally unacceptdrew
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1092.
102. Id. at 1096.
103. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1249-50 (2d Cir. 1994).
104. Jeffries, 828 F Supp. at 1071.
105. See, e.g., id. at 1075, 1077 ("Amazingly, President Harleston expressed conwithout havcerns in this letter about the impact of Professor Jeffries' conduct
ing required any formal investigation into such matters" and "[astonishingly, there
is no written record or document of any kind that memorializes this important decision
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able behavior for a Department Chair, the CUNY adminustrators allowed Professor Jeffnes to retain his Chairmanship,
only sending him a letter of reprimand."°
There were cases of students dropping Jeffries' courses and
asking for refunds because, to quote one student, Jeffries "spouted the most racist line of nonsense."" 7 His classes were reviewed by a student for a campus newspaper, and the adinmstration could have taken notice of the absurd content of these
classes.'
Indeed, the defendants provided evidence that they
were looking for a new chairman even before the speech. 9 For
the judge, however, "there [was] insufficient evidence that there
was a purposeful and structured search or a sense of urgency
)A1o
about the matter
The defense's introduction of Jeffries' past derelictions, and
other more recent bizarre and disruptive acts, seem to have
worked against it, in the judge's opinion:
The defendants' position is undermined by their own presentation at trial of broad evidence of impropriety and extremely
questionable behavior on the part of Professor Jeffries well
before the speech. This evidence suggests, and certainly the
jury could have found, that the
incidents cited by defendants which occurred [after Jeffies' term as chairman was
reduced] were
characteristic of Professor Jeffries' conduct
throughout his tenure at the College."'
The judge appears to have concluded that, if outrageous behavior in the past did not lead the College to take action against
Jeffries, then it must have been only his constitutionally protected speech which led to the reduction of his chairmanship; the
judge credited the jury with having reached a similar conclusion.
The College tried to put the speech in the context of many actions, of which the speech was the last straw; to Judge Conboy,

106.
107.
108.
ing a
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1097 n.50.
Id. at 1097.
See id. (noting that President Harleston had received a memorandum containstudent's article describing Professor Jeffries' discredited racial theories).
Id at 1081.
Id.
Id. at 1081-82 (citations omitted).
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the College was "cowardly"112 in not responding to Jeffries in
the past, 13
and only the uproar led to the reduction of his chair1
manship.
Demonstrating that Jeffries had hurt the College seems a very
simple task. The College's alumni, and its major contributors,
are in large measure Jewish.114 The College was aware of how
angry alumni were at Jeffries and at the College for maintaining
him in is position.1 15 The administration sent letters to alumni trying to mollify them.116 Certainly Jeffries' activities must
have affected fundraising, and President Harleston so testified."' To Judge Conboy, however, the defendants' evidence
was not sufficient: "defendants made no attempt to provide data
or an analysis of alumni giving after the speech. Nor did the
defendants present any correspondence from alumni or put on

the stand a single alumnus

)118

In is two opinions, Judge Conboy clearly revealed that his
sympathies lay with Michael Levin, whom City College unfairly
penalized for his speech, and against Leonard Jeffries, against
whom the administration, had it not been cowardly and incompetent could have made a good case for some sanction. The College and the defendants could have justified such sanctions on
the basis that Jeffries' activities hurt the department, the College, and the cause of education. Indeed, they could even have
acted against him despite is right to protected speech had they
demonstrated that Jeffres "had turned his classroom into a forum for bizarre, shallow, racist and incompetent pseudo-thinking and pseudo-teaching."" 9 Judge Conboy's reference to
shards of evidence suggests that he believed the College could
have shown this. 2 °
But the fact that the administration never acted against

112. Id. at 1097.
113. Id.
114. At trial, the defendants attempted to show that alumni contributions declined
significantly after Jeffries' anti-semitic speech. See id. at 1082.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1074.
117. Id. at 1082.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1071.
120. Id.
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Jeffries until after the public uproar was decisive: the College
had punished him for speech on a matter of public interest. 2 '
Thus, the two defendants were formally in the same posture as
against the College, and deserved the same relief. We come back
to the issue, then, that before the law and its defense of free
speech, no difference exists between Levin and Jeffries. My argument is that there are vast differences between the two cases,
differences that seem irrelevant to the law, but should be of the
essence for an academic institution and the values of higher
education. Because they could not be considered under the rubric of the constitutional protection of free speech, I see a radical
discordance between the way the cases should have been handled under academic criteria, the way they were actually handled by the administration of the College, and the way they were
finally determined in federal court.'22
THE DIFFERENCES THAT SHOULD HAVE MATTERED

The key difference was that Levin was engaged in legitimate
academic activities, which are generally summed up under the
three headings of research, teaching, and public comment;"
Jeffries conducted no research,2 his teaching was outrageous, 25 and only his public comment deserved protection. Research and teaching are considered essential duties of a college
professor; the more vaguely defined area of public service and
commentary may be another duty of college professors, especial121. Id. at 1071-72.
122. Note, however, that the case of Professor Jeffries is still unresolved. The Supreme Court has remanded the case to the-distnct court for findings consistent with
its recent decision in Waters u. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), in which the Court
held that the Government, in its capacity as an employer, has broader powers to
terminate and regulate its employees than does the Government in its capacity as
sovereign. Jeffies v. Harleston, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994).
123. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. LEVIN, FEMINISM AND FREEDOM (1987); MICHAEL E. LEVIN, METAPHYSICS AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM (1979). Levin has also published
many articles in philosophical journals as well as articles in journals of public af-

fairs. There is also no record of any complaint about Is teaching over the years.
124. There is no record of any research publication by Jeffries. He did, however,
complete his dissertation for his Ph.D. at Columbia prior to coming to City College.
125. See JAMES TRAUB, CITY ON A HILL (1994); James Traub, The Hearts and
Minds of City College, NEW YORKER, June 7, 1993, at 42 (reporting on Leonard
Jeffries' teaching and public service activities).
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ly when this duty is exercised on the basis of professional qualification in a specialized field. However, comment on public affairs may also be considered simply a part of one's role as a
citizen, entirely independent of faculty obligations, duties, or
restraints.
Levin's problem, as his suit made clear, was that his classes
were disrupted, and the College, he complained, did little to restrain the disrupters or to punish them.'26 The College also set
up a section of the required course Levin taught to parallel his
own and informed students that if they believed they would be
uncomfortable in Levin's section they could transfer to the new
one.12 ' Additionally, a committee was established to examine
Levin's behavior-that is, his research, writing and public
talks-to determine if any action against him was appropriate,12 and Levin believed129 that this action might include the
termination of his tenure.
In regard to Professor Levin, the duty of the College admimstrator was simply to take no notice of Levin's activities, aside
from fulfilling the necessary duty of preventing his classes from
being disrupted and enabling him to continue his work as a
teacher and researcher. It would have been perfectly legitimate
to point out to disrupters and protesters that the College protects the freedom of inquiry and discussion of faculty and students as well as the right to contest the positions taken by researchers and advocates within reasonable limits. Instead, Levin
argued in his suit, and the court found, the College joined in his
harassment. 30
In the case of Leonard Jeffries, what he was doing as a teacher and scholar was beyond the pale of what was acceptable in a
college. Clearly the College at some point should have taken notice of his performance. While I would go so far as to say he no
longer deserved the protection of tenure, as little as a geographer who insists that the earth is flat, or a historian who asserts
that human history began with the creation of the earth in the

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Levm
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

v. Harleston, 770 F Supp. 895, 903-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
907-10.
910-17.
925.
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year 4004 B.C., I understand why City College or any other
institution that grants tenure would have hesitated to withdraw
this protection. Prudential grounds rather than grounds of
principle made it unwise. The costs of dismissing a professor
with tenure are so great it is simply not worth it. The costs in
this case would not only have been monetary, involving something in the order of an extended trial with appeals and the like,
but would certainly have included considerable disruption resulting from Jeffries' core of fervent supporters among his students.' 3 '
In the Levin case, the College acted not to defend him but
to examine is suitability, in the Jeffries case it reduced the
term of his chairmanship only after huge public protest. 1 2 The
question I raised at the beginmng as to the equivalence of the
two cases can now be sharpened. Levin was engaged in a legitimate exercise of scholarship, despite the pain it caused and the
strains it introduced into relationships between the races.
Jeffries aroused the same pain and strain, mostly by raising the
specter of the irrational hatred of the Jews. From the point of
view of an institution of higher education, they stood in very
different positions, and the differences between them should
have led to differences in how they were treated. When they
both end up in the same court, treated under the same law, both
equally declared worthy of the protection of their free
speech, 33 I think something has gone wrong. It may of course
be true that both the scholar and the charlatan are deserving of
equal treatment under the law,' but they are not deserving of
equal treatment by an institution of higher education.
ACADEMIC VALUES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

What is at issue here is the difference between how the law
appears to treat freedom of speech and how the academy must

131. See Traub, supra note 125, at 42-43 (describing Jeffries' "cultlike" following at
City College).
132. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1073-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
133. See id. at 1098; Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 919-24.
134. To the extent that the Constitution affords equal protections to both ndividu-
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treat freedom of speech. From the point of view of constitutional
law, what is said in a case of freedom of speech is of no consequence.' There was no reason to examine the truth, by whatever means available, of what Levin had written and what
Jeffries had said. "Under our system, there is 'no such thing as a
false idea,' " according to the Supreme Court. 136 The issue in a
claim brought under the constitutional protection of free speech
is not what was written or said but what was done by some authority on the basis of what was said.'37 From the point of view
of colleges and universities, what was written and said, and its
relation to the primary function of colleges and universities, the
search for and the teaching of truth, should be of the essence.
Tins essence is a matter of indifference to a court applying the
constitutional law of freedom of speech.
One who is convinced of the substantial difference between
the two cases when judged by academic criteria is likely to conclude, seeing that these criteria played no role at all in the legal
arguments and decisions in the two cases, that something must
be wrong with the law to which they appealed, the judge who
tried their cases, or the forum in which the cases were tried.
One cannot argue very effectively that the law or the judge was
defective, considering the law on its own terms from a perspective witun the field of constitutional law and considering the
judge as an agent upholding federal legal principles. Both decisions have been upheld, in their crucial parts, by the Second
Circuit, 3 ' so it is not possible to easily fault the law or the

judge.
My argument is that the forum was wrong. These cases belong in the academy, to be settled by academic institutions and
the formal and informal bodies, within and outside the institutions, that are expected to maintain the integrity of academic
life. These were not matters for federal courts, judges, and constitutional law on the subject of free speech.

135. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 31-32 (1993).

136. Id. at 32 (citing Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
137. See id. at 31-32.
138. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1250 (2d Cir. 1994); Levin v. Harleston,
966 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1992).
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At one time, it was still a subject of serious discussion whether academic regulations of various kinds should be subject to the
law governing free speech as developed by the judiciary 3 9
This was the case at the beginning of the free speech movement
in Berkeley in the 1960s, when some of us argued that the Umversity had an independent right to regulate some kinds of student political behavior (e.g., where tables distributing and selling leaflets could be put up), 40 and this was not to be decided
by the law governing what could be done in public spaces or by
judges who might know much about constitutional law but little
about the conditions that were desirable for colleges and umversities.4
At the time, this was considered a conservative position. This
is not surprising, because in the mid-1960s colleges, universities,
and academic bodies were still considered, for the most part,
conservative institutions, and if they ruled on such matters they
were expected to rule in a conservative direction. Courts, it is
true, were also more conservative at the time, but they operated
under constitutional law, which was becoming steadily more
expansive in its interpretation of what was protected under the
First Amendment. In contrast, the regulations of autonomous
institutions which had some supervisory role over young people
were then more restrictive. Those were the days, we should recall, when boys and girls were uniformly separated by a substantial distance in college living quarters, and when indeed
they were still called boys and girls, implying that they were
properly subject to parental discipline by the institution's authorized representatives.
This view, that an independent and autonomous academic
institution may properly have rules different from those the
courts have established for society in general and that these
rules may be more restrictive than those established by the
courts, is now considered a liberal or even radical position.' It

139. See NATHAN GLAZER, REMEMBERING THE ANSWERS: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN
STUDENT REVOLT 250-72 (1970) (discussing campus rights and responsibilities). But
see supra note 122.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See MATSUDA, supra note 135 (providing an example of authors whose posi-

726

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:703

is this point of view, after all, which justifies "speech codes" on
campus. When Professor Randall Kennedy of Harvard argued in
a public forum for the legitimacy of rules in an academic institution more restrictive than the rules that govern what any citizen
can do in the public street, he was criticized roundly in an editorial in the Wall Street Journal.
The Journal wrote:
At a forum on universities and free speech held at Harvard
recently, Professor Randall Kennedy of Harvard Law School
challenged the close association between free speech [on campus] and the First Amendment. According to an account of
Prof. Kennedy's 'argument' in the Harvard Gazette, the
university's official newspaper:
"A university must set its own standards because the Supreme Court can rule either way on freedom of expression
cases," he said. "If the court, for example, ruled that shouting
racial epithets was protected under the Constitution, then
Harvard should offer less free speech than the surrounding
society," he reasoned.
He reasoned?...
The Journal had forgotten, or never knew, that this was once
sound conservative doctrine.
Of course we all know the reason why liberals and radicals
may want special rules for the campus, such as speech codes,
sexual harassment regulations, and the like. Liberal faculty and
administrators, responding to the pressure of minority student
leaders and strong feminists, are now the ones who would most
likely write and enforce these codes, not the conservative umversity and college administrations of the past. Administrations
today are hardly and rarely conservative. Administrations were
once more conservative than their faculties. They are now commonly more liberal, responsive to demonstrating activist students who have taken up the causes of minorities and women.
The refuge of any administrator who is not enthusiastic about

tions are considered liberal or radical due to their belief that hate speech may be
regulated by public and campus authorities).
143. Restoring Liberal Education, WALL ST. J., May 10, 1993, at A10 (emphasis
added).
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enacting new and more stringent rules to protect the sensitivities of minority organization militants and feminists, or about
punishing those students and faculty insufficiently respectful of
these sensitivities, is to resort to general constitutional law- We
cannot have a code, they say, or too strict a code, for the courts
will not allow it.
The rules that conservatives once defended against the overriding right of free speech were restrictive rules to control nontraditional and radical student behavior and political behavior.
The conservatives lost: free speech on campus came to mean
that campus rules could be no more restrictive than those of the
public market place.' The rules that are likely to be written
today will also be restrictive, but they will be written and implemented generally by liberal student bodies and admimstrators, responsive to the sensitivities of minorities and women.
Now it is conservatives who resort to the constitutional law of
free speech to prevent the implementation of these rules. One
wonders whether this is the best we can do, whether our constitutional principles are simply partisan weapons, brought into
play depending on who will write and enforce the rules, and that
alone will determine whether we cry "free speech" or not.
The question then becomes whether there is any general principle that should prevail regarding the govermng of the academy
and the relationship of its government to the general principles
of constitutional law, or is it all a matter of whose ox is gored. If
we are conservative, and college administrations are conservative, we are all for the independence and autonomy of colleges
and universities; when administrations become liberal or fall
under the influence of liberal or radical students and faculty,
conservatives will turn against the principle of academic autonomy Alternatively, liberals will resort to the courts when conservatives are powerful in academic administration, and insist on
their autonomous right to regulate speech when they are in
control.
The constitutional law of free speech is a crude instrument
indifferent to the content of speech, and that is as it should

144. See Levm v. Harleston, 770 F Supp. 895, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting the
strictness of the standard applicable to the regulation of free speech in this context).
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be. 4" At the margin, there is the potential limitation of libel
law, and there is the still disputed question of whether "group
libel" should be allowed as a cause of action, but on the whole
the First Amendment, intended for the government of the polity,
146
takes no stand on content.
AND WHEN THE ACADEMY IS DERELICT9

The college and university cannot escape judgment by refusing to take a stand on content. Indeed, in the Levin and Jeffries
cases the College did take a stand on content. 14 1 It happened to
be, because of the constellation of political forces, the wrong
stand from the point of view of academic values. The search for
truth was punished, the demagogic spread of falsehoods was
unpunished. The College censured Levin and refused to act
against Jeffries until a political uproar forced it to do so. 1 48 The
College administrators took a stand on content and were punished for doing so-both men were exonerated and could continue to propagate their point of view without fear of any loss of
rights and privileges.' The academic response in the two cases was exactly the reverse of what it should have been. This perhaps settles the matter. Crude as the instrument of constitutionally defined free speech is for settling matters of truth and legitimacy in the academy, it was the only one available, and so
there is no longer any argument for academic autonomy That
may be our situation today Let me point to two further defects
in the laws regulating freedom of speech in the context of college
and university faculty
First, the Levin and Jeffries complaints were resolved under
principles that developed in cases dealing with the rights of public employees to speak without penalty 150 Thus, for example,

145. See id. at 921 (explaining that a state must have a compelling interest in the
curtailment of speech when it is the content of the speech which the state aims to
interdict) (citing Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-101- (1972)).
146. See id.
147. Levin, 770 F Supp. at 895; Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
148. Levin, 770 F Supp. at 926; Jeffries, 828 F Supp. at 1097.
149. Levin, 770 F Supp. at 927; Jeffries, 828 F Supp. at 1098.
150. Levin, 770 F Supp. 895; Jeffries, 828 F Supp. 1066.
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the cases cited by the judges and the appeals courts deal with
such issues as whether a comment by an employee that she
hoped the President would be assassinated was fair public comment and therefore protected.1 5 ' The law of constitutionally
protected free speech turns out to be a procrustean bed in which
academic issues are placed uneasily It has been developed in
cases brought by public employees in hierarchical agencies of
government whose duies are remote from scholarship and
teaching, and who were penalized for some casual remark.152
This seems hardly relevant to Levin, Jeffries, and similar cases.
This law became applicable because City College is a public
institution, "' 3 and so it is regulated under law developed in
cases brought by policemen, social workers, claims adjudicators,
and the like. Whether the same law would have applied to a
private university is murky, but it is hard to see how this distinction could have been maintained-every private college and
university takes public funds, or its students do, or benefits from
the tax code, ergo it can be argued it is also "public."
Second, Levin presented his controversial views outside of
class, and outside the context of the college." Is it a virtue or
a defect, from the point of view of an institution of higher education, that ins views on these topics were not presented in class,
or on the campus? It certainly suggests that he was not activated by any desire to heighten group conflict or animosity, because
he had to know his views would be controversial and would
arouse anger. He tried to keep them away from the context of
his teaching. Perhaps it was simply caution and prudence that
led him to separate his views on these subjects from his teaching. A long digression would be required to explore this nice
issue in self-censorship, but, in any case, it reflects another
significant difference from Jeffries that the law could not take
into account: Jeffries' controversial doctrines were the chief

151. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (holding that plaintiffs speech was
protected under the First Amendment).
152. See, e.g., id.
153. See Levin, 770 F Supp. at 898 (noting that City College is a public institution).
154. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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subject of his classroom lectures. 155
In the end, the key issue is truth. The issues over which Levm
was harassed are serious ones in psychological research on intelligence and its determinants and in moral philosophical disputes
on the legitimacy of taking into account one's behavior towards
individuals' statistical patterns that differentiate various groups.
Reginald Wilson, in his letter on Mary Lefkowitz quoted above,
writes, "Ms. Lefkowitz says as long as it wears the trappings of
science and 'reasoned argument' it's all right. This kind of vast
loophole lets a lot of racist scholarship through."15 When racism wears the trappings of science and reasoned argument, it remains racism, and should be condemned. But, does this properly
characterize Levn's work? Is there not a means of distinguishing between racism wearing the trappings of science and reasoned argument and legitimate science? If there is a meaningful
difference, who is capable of making the distinction? Certainly
not the courts defending the right of free speech; as we have
seen, they are indifferent to the content of the speech they defend. If there is a difference between science, scholarship, and
reasoned argument, and non-science and irrational argument-and I believe, despite some recent academic trends which
seem to deny the difference, or our ability to make it, there
is-the community of scholars and scientists must make the
distinction and act on it, and one of the places in which they
gather to do so is the college and university This difference has
to be taken into account in making academic distinctions.
This difference was taken into account at City College but in a
perverse, if understandable, way Because their concern was disruption, and black students and their supporters were likely to
be much more disruptive than Jewish students and their supporters,157 the authorities were severe in their actions against
Levin.

Levin deserved the protection of the administration against
students trying to disrupt his classes; Jeffnes deserved its con-

155. See supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
156. Wilson, supra note 19, at B3.
157. See generally, Levin, 770 F Supp 895, 898-918 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (providing
information concerning the action against Levin).
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tempt, and whatever action it could take to limit his influence. If
we defend academic autonomy, we have to confront the problem
that the treatment of the two men was exactly the opposite.
What about academic autonomy under these circumstances?
Do we abandon it? Do we resort to the courts, so a decent scholar and teacher may be protected, even at the cost of the protection of a charlatan?
CONCLUSION
Our situation today is that both will resort to the courts, as

well as many others, whether to protest decisions not to grant
tenure, censure under new rules of sexual harassment, punishment for unpopular opimons, or actions in response to political

pressure. The courts will find some basis, inappropriate as it
may be to any given situation, for judgment. Just as any tenure
decision today can be disputed in the courts on grounds of dis-,
crimination on the basis of race, sex, age, or physical disabilities,
so too any decision to uphold prime academic values of truth and
responsible scholarship-if any institutions are so bold as to
make such distinctions-would be disputed. Mary Lefkowitz, the
classical scholar referred to in Reginald Wilson's letter, first
entered this dispute when she reported the story of a visitor to
the Wellesley campus in connection with Black History Month
who claimed Aristotle had burned down the famous library at
Alexandria.158 When she pointed out this was impossible, that
the library did not exist in his day, students said, how do you
know, maybe there is later information our visitor has that you
are not aware of, and faculty members shied away from the
issue, because it was not their field.'59 If this is the way our
academic institutions manage such issues today, if we can expect their students, faculty, and often their admimstrations to
respond to arrant nonsense in this way, perhaps there is no
alternative but the courts, which may be able to impose at least
a modicum of crude fairness.
This means they will also intervene on such matters as
158. Mary Lefkowitz, Combating False Theories in the Classroom, CHRON. HIGHER

EDUC., Jan. 19, 1994, at B2.
159. Id.
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whether a chairman should serve for three years or one, and in
doing so, of course, they will not be able to take into account the
many subtle factors that go into making such a decision (or that
go into decisions on tenure) but will be able to wield only the
clubs of free speech or nondiscrimination. Of course these pnnclples should be adhered to in colleges and universities, as they
should be throughout society But when we give them absolute
primacy, the proper functions and prime aims of academic institutions will be reduced to insignificance. We will be fair: truth
and nonsense, competence and incompetence, will hold the same
position.
Perhaps there is no alternative. City College was certainly
doing a very poor job in making these necessary distinctions, but
when it was corrected by the courts it was not, as we have seen,
to uphold truth and competence, but free speech. Perhaps the
ideal of academic autonomy has become an anachronism: the
institutions cannot be expected to act correctly, and must be
viewed with minatory suspicion. I would prefer to think of the
present situation as simply a bad time in colleges and universities-not all of them-and that academic ideals remain as ideals
and will prevail in many institutions in decision-making. For the
rest, one has the options of voice or exit. If voice will be ignored
by a herd of conformists, and exit is too personally painful, then
the courts and the law still remain, with all their limitations.
We should not be too comfortable with this alternative if we
have any concern for the missions of institutions of higher education.

